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Essay review 
Personal development and intellectual biography: the case of Robert Boyle 
Robert Boyle, The Early  Essays and Ethics of Robert Boyle, edited and annotated, with an 
Introduction by  John  T. Harwood.  Carbondale and  Edwardsville: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1991. Pp. lxix+330.  ISBN 0-8093-1522-X. $39.95. 
When the eighteen-year-old Robert Boyle first took  possession of his manor house in 
Stalbridge  in 1645, he was a young man without a vocation. He had been to Eton, where 
he had learnt some Latin and French, and had been on the Grand Tour, where he had seen 
all the usual unusual things. Two years earlier  he had lost his father, the great Earl of Cork, 
and had almost lost the means to live as a leisured  gentleman. The Irish Rebellion of 1641 
had temporarily cut off all the Boyles from their enormous income in land rents. The bad 
news arriving  while Robert was still touring the Continent, he had discreetly turned aside 
his father's suggestion that he seek a military  post in the Low Countries, and for two years 
had probably been obliged to live off his tutor's credit in Geneva, waiting for funds to 
arrive and the Irish rebels to be reduced. As a younger son, Robert knew he would not 
inherit the Cork earldom, and briefly mulled over the possibility that he might be obliged 
'honorably [to] gaine my living' in some useful profession. But matters soon improved: the 
important Dorset estate had been secured to his personal possession and the flow of funds 
from Ireland resumed, initially a  trickle, increasing to  full  spate by the Restoration. 
Returning to the British Isles in the middle of 1644, Robert stayed for some months with 
his intellectually formidable older sister Katherine,  Lady Ranelagh, in her Holborn house, 
where he met a circle of parliamentary  and allied thinkers (including  John Milton, Samuel 
Hartlib, John Dury, and Benjamin Worsley), some of whom had very pronounced ideas 
about what a young man of means and moral disposition might usefully do with his life. 
Proceeding to Stalbridge  the following year, Boyle set himself up as an uncommon sort 
of country gentleman. While he evidently accepted the customary gentlemanly  obligations 
to visit and be visited, to hunt, hawk and fish, young Robert let it be known that he 
disapproved of these patterns as the be-all and end-all of gentry. He would, of course, be 
a  gentleman of  means  and  leisure -  and  something else  still  to  be  decided. Boyle's 
Stalbridge residence lasted from 1645 to  1655, and during this period he experimented 
incessantly with the constitution, justification and dissemination of patterns for a happy 
and virtuous life. How was one to acquit both Christian and gentlemanly duties? What 
were one's obligations to God, one's self, and the commonwealth? In general terms, what 
was  the  legitimate nature of  vocation,  and, in particular, what  was  the nature of  a 
legitimate vocation for him? 
Thanks to the superb editorial work of John T. Harwood, historians now have effective 
access to a range of ethical and devotional essays Boyle produced at Stalbridge  from c. 1645 
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to c. 1650. These include the 60,000-word tract known as The Aretology (Royal Society 
Boyle Papers Vol.  195), which has already been so importantly put to use in James R. 
Jacob's interpretations of the ideological roots of Boyle's natural philosophy,' as well as 
shorter religious essays on  sin  and piety,  and experiments in  moral discipline: 'The 
Doctrine  of  Thinking',  'The  Dayly  Reflection',  and  'Of  Time  and  Idleness  '2  The 
Aretology or Ethicall Elements canvasses and assesses ideas about the nature, bases, and 
means of inculcating virtue. Although it was not evidently intended for publication, neither 
was it written in a confessional mode: an imagined 'Reader' is repeatedly invoked and 
much of  the exercise is concerned with  finding effective inducements to  virtue which 
presuppose a communicative exercise. 
It is difficult to  do justice either to  Harwood's service to  students of  early modern 
science, or to the heroic labour involved in producing richly annotated diplomatic editions 
of these writings. Perhaps only those who have put in some time in the Royal Society 
wrestling with the crabbed  and crowded handwriting  of The Aretology, and who have had 
three pages of transcription  and a headache to show for a day's work, can fully appreciate 
the editor's diligence and dedication to accuracy. This volume also includes an important 
fifty-page  editorial introduction locating Boyle's early essays in the general context of mid- 
seventeenth-century  Protestant apologetic and ethical writing. Harwood is an extremely 
able literary historian, one of whose recent concerns has been to interpret the writings of 
early modern natural philosophers as situated rhetorical practices. Unlike many of those 
taking the so-called 'rhetorical turn' in the history of science, Harwood knows a lot about 
rhetoric. He wants to know where natural philosophers' writing (and reading) practices 
came from in the culture and what these practices were intended to achieve in the context 
in which they were used. He deconstructs literary  practices not merely -  as is increasingly 
the fashion -  to display their deconstructability,  but to recruit  the results of his analyses for 
cultural  historical projects. This is literary  history of science in its most constructive  mood. 
These materials have both particular and general significance for historians of science. 
Boyle  was  between  eighteen and twenty-three years of  age  when  these essays were 
produced. It was not until 1660, when he was thirty-three, that he published a scientific 
tract - New  Experiments Physico-Mechanical touching the Spring of the Air -  under his 
own name.3 Taken together with the autobiographical essay Philaretus dating from the 
same period,4 one might expect these earlier writings to offer some solid and significant 
answers to the questions 'Why did Boyle become a scientist?', 'What motivated him to the 
particular  scientific views which he later propagated  and with which he affiliated  himself?' 
1 Especially James R. Jacob, Robert Boyle and the English Revolution: A Study in Social and Intellectual 
Change, New York: Burt Franklin, 1977, especially chs. 2-3;  'The ideological origins of Robert Boyle's natural 
philosophy', Journal of European  Studies (1972), 2, 1-21; 'Boyle's atomism and the Restoration assault on pagan 
naturalism', Social Studies of Science (1978), 8, 211-33. 
2  Harwood also includes as an appendix Boyle's meditation on 'Joseph's Mistress', evidently intended for 
inclusion in Occasional Reflections, and a partial catalogue of Boyle's library. 
3  An  essay  commending  openness  in  the  communication  of  medical  receipts  (written in  1647)  was 
anonymously published in 1655: see Margaret  E. Rowbottom, 'The earliest published writings of Robert Boyle', 
Annals of Science (1950), 6, 376-89. 
4  Boyle,  'An  account of  Philaretus during his minority', printed in R. E. W. Maddison,  The Life of  the 
Honourable Robert Boyle F.R.S., London: Taylor & Francis, 1969, 2-45. 
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Nevertheless, here and in  other connections, I want  to  caution  against certain well- 
entrenched  and commonsensical procedures  in the history-of-ideas  and biographical  genres 
which can result in questionable over-interpretation  of materials like these. And I want to 
suggest alternative ways of viewing evidence of personal development which may have 
some general significance for the biographical genre. 
For all the considerable interest of these materials, it needs to be stressed that they do 
not effectively support an answer to developmental questions about why Boyle became a 
natural philosopher, still less why he became an experimental or corpuscular natural 
philosopher. These are not the records  of physical experiments  but of youthful experiments 
in constructing and justifying moral identity. A number of identities and repertoires of 
moral justification  were being canvassed here and in related early writings. (If one were so 
minded, there would be no problem at all in spotting a series of 'inconsistencies' in these 
materials.) And, while it is technically possible to ransack these writings for signs of later 
scientific views,  such indications are sufficiently sparse to  give the historian pause in 
treating the essays matter-of-factly as tokens of, so to speak, 'important developments 
which we know came later'. Jacob, for example, has pointed to passages in The Aretology 
and associated early manuscripts that commended natural knowledge for its utility to 
ethics (pp. 55, line 34 to 56, line 1), or which specified  moral messages available to be read 
in the Book of Nature (p. 56, lines 24-34).' Yet, despite the fact that Boyle was at this time 
doing chemical work in his Stalbridge laboratory,6  there is precious little in these essays 
that speaks to an identification with natural philosophical or natural historical culture. 
Neither at age eighteen nor at twenty-three did Boyle evidently know what we think we 
know: that he was going to be a scientist. 
There is nothing inherently wrong about assessing earlier life-stages in terms of later 
developments. We can always ask how an individual got from stage a to stage b, just as 
the Darwinian evolutionist can inspect fossil Australopithecus  as part of inquiries into the 
origins of Homo sapiens, but there are some seldom-acknowledged  contingent risks of so 
doing. In so far as we make out a mature  state as the 'realization' of some earlier  laid-down 
pattern, or as the response to some earlier  trauma, influence  or problem, we buy into some 
highly contestable psychological theorizing. The issue here is not mono- versus multi- 
causal explanation, though special problems are, no doubt, associated with the former. It 
is, instead, about the sufficiency  of any account of an individual at one time in explaining 
his transition to a future state. The risk of 'realization stories' is that they belong to a genre 
which tends to treat personal development as a process taking place within an individual's 
competence rather than as the complex continual flux of transactions between individual 
and setting. And if all we do is to search the individual at time n for the traces of his 
constitution at time n + 1, we rule out or restrict a substantive role for circumstance and 
5  Jacob, Boyle, op. cit. (1), 76-8,  112. 
6  Historians ought not automatically to equate the possession of, and work in, an early modern chemical 
laboratory with 'natural philosophical' commitments. It was not uncommon for mid-century gentlemen (and 
gentlewomen) to have a laboratory or still-house for the preparation of medicines and distilled spirits, and we 
know  that the hypochondriacal Boyle had as an adolescent developed an interest in medical receipts, self- 
medication, and the provision of more effective medicines to the people. In the event, mid-seventeenth-century 
culture importantly distinguished between the practices called 'chymistry' and 'natural philosophy'. 
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contingency in personal development.7 Think how  many times your own life has been 
changed by an unpredictable  happening or meeting. Think also about the moral context 
in  which  we  may  invest  so  much  labour  in  translating the  unpredictable and  the 
environmental into an aspect of our intrinsic pattern of personal development. It sounds 
so much finer  to say that I always wanted to be the kind of academic  I am now than it does 
to acknowledge the role of fortune in securing a certain job and the role of colleagues in 
shaping my cultural environment. We tell 'realization stories' about ourselves, and those 
who approve of us help us tell them, as a way of stressing  the intrinsic  springs  of our actions 
and as a way of pouring value on those actions. Because such narratives  are storehouses 
of value, their plausibilities are highly protected by a wide range of everyday  and academic 
practices. Yet, from a more disinterested  point of view, 'realization stories' are no more 
plausible than those which point to  causally effective interactions between individual 
development and setting. 
In the present case, I want to say that we still do not know, and may never securely 
know, why Boyle became a 'natural philosopher'. Harwood notes that there is no evidence 
from Boyle's childhood or early adolescence that indicates 'a special interest or aptitude 
for natural philosophy' (p. xxiii). What we know of his dealings with the Hartlib circle 
from the mid-1640s still seems insufficient  to motivate a 'choice' that evidently was not 
made until, at the earliest, the mid- to late 1650s; and evidence from his early Oxford 
period (from c. 1655) when he first entered academic philosophers' everyday society is 
unsatisfactorily patchy. Moreover, there are good substantive reasons to be sceptical of 
interpretations  that causally link Boyle's scientific views too tightly to any early patterns 
or circumstances, whether of  temperament, parental or collegial influence, or political 
context. 
'Realization'  stories are made still more problematic if we proceed ahistorically in 
defining 'what  the individual was'  at time n +1.  Indeed, even the notion  that Boyle 
'became a natural philosopher' is debatable on historicist grounds. Boyle continued to 
publish moral and theological tracts to the end of his life, and into the eighteenth century 
he enjoyed a substantial reputation as a moralist. The funeral sermon preached by his 
friend the Rev. Gilbert  Burnet  eulogized Boyle as 'a Christian  Philosopher', celebrating  his 
personal piety and religious good works, assimilating his general learning, medical and 
chemical researches  to devotional and philanthropic purposes, and passing over what we 
recognize as his natural philosophical projects almost as an aside. Technically speaking, 
Burnet's sermon in fact never referred to Boyle as a 'natural philosopher': the relevant 
passages catalogued the range of his knowledge - of Hebrew and other oriental languages, 
scripture and theology, the 'mathematical sciences', geography, physic, 'the history of 
nature,  ancient  and  modern',  and  chemistry  ('his  peculiar  and  favourite  study  ').8 
7  Here  I  allude to  important work  on  personal development by  the  sociologist  Howard  S. Becker the 
significance of which for the genre of intellectual biography has yet to be adequately recognized: 'Notes on the 
concept of commitment', American Journal of Sociology  (1960), 66, 32-40;  'Personal change in adult life', 
Sociometry (1964), 27, 40-53  (both reprinted in Becker, Sociological Work: Method and Substance, Chicago: 
Aldine, 1970). 
8  Gilbert Burnet, 'Character of a Christian Philosopher, in a Sermon Preached January 7,  1691-2,  at the 
Funeral of the Hon. Robert Boyle', in idem, Lives, Characters, and An Address to Posterity (ed. John Jebb), 
London: James Duncan, 1833, 325-76, quoting 368-70. 
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Moreover, the pattern of  the  'Christian Virtuoso'  which Boyle both exemplified and 
offered for emulation was not simply that of a 'natural philosopher' but of a special kind 
of religiously inspired person who could participate in, and appropriate  resources from, a 
wide range of cultural  practices, including natural  philosophy, in his whole-hearted  pursuit 
of virtue. An important, much insisted upon and widely acknowledged, aspect of Boyle's 
public character  throughout his life was that neither his identity nor his life-project  was to 
be circumscribed  by the interests or conventions of any such specialized cultural practices 
as chemistry, medicine, theology or natural philosophy. The role of the Christian  virtuoso 
might encompass that of  a natural philosopher, but it was not  co-extensive with  any 
version of that role.9 
Despite the wealth of manuscript and textual material which we now have available, 
developmental inquiries into Boyle's life and work will likely remain beset by a range of 
practical difficulties. Harwood himself situates the interest of these early ethical essays 
within a broadly developmental rubric, seeking to make 'accessible the intellectual and 
religious origins of  Boyle's most  vital  themata'.  These  writings 'disclose  intellectual 
questions, patterns of interest, habits of mind, and ... methods of expression that persisted 
into and perhaps shaped later writing' (p. xvii). There is no doubt about that persistence. 
Publications to the end of Boyle's life liberally drew upon findings, drafts, and even precise 
turns of phrase which he produced when he was still a very young man at Stalbridge. 
Prefaces to Boyle's mature publications commonly specified that this was the case and 
recruited that  circumstance for  important  expository  functions.  It  was,  more  than 
anything, a device Boyle employed publicly to disengage his self from the views presented 
in his texts, and thus to achieve a more disinterested  appearance  than that available to any 
mere fame-seeking  author whose present self stood behind and vouched for current  textual 
claims.  Indeed,  Boyle  willingly  and  repeatedly  stipulated  the  chronologically  and 
structurally  incoherent nature of his texts, and even, to an extent, the possible invalidity 
of certain claims contained therein.10  These were, after all, publications designed to serve 
alter rather than to glorify ego. Too much concern for coherence and exactness bespoke 
a proud quest for authorial fame." For the historian interested in personal development, 
both the technical incoherence of Boyle's texts and the apologetically identified possible 
mismatch between text and current belief present enormous problems. What we know is 
that Boyle continued to find many youthful turns of phrase and formulae of his early 
ethical essays useful resources for later publications. What we cannot know, with similar 
certainty, is that whatever states of belief may have animated them in the 1640s 'persisted' 
9  I develop this interpretation  of Boyle's identity in a chapter entitled 'Who was Robert Boyle? The creation 
and presentation of  an  experimental self'  in  my  forthcoming book  A  Social History of  Truth: Gentility, 
Credibility, and Scientific Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century  England, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994, ch. 4. 
10 See, for example, Boyle, 'Usefulness of experimental natural philosophy', in Boyle, Works, ed. Thomas 
Birch, 6 vols., London, 1772, ii, 1-246, on 4; idem, 'Medicina hydrostatica', ibid., v, 453-89, on 454. 
11 In work to be published, Harwood has sought to display Boyle's possible interest in authorial celebrity: 
John T. Harwood, 'Science Writing and Writing Science: Robert Boyle and Rhetorical Theory', paper given to 
The  Stalbridge Boyle Symposium, 14-16  December 1991. Of course, a  'real'  concern for fame is perfectly 
compatible with textual strategies designed to deny it (in my humble opinion). 
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into his maturity or that these early sentiments 'shaped later writing' in any but a loose 
sense. That, I think, would be to over-interpret  early writings as developmentally potent, 
to grant too much to early life and too little to later. 
For the present, it is enough to deflect some attention away from these early essays as 
signs of later scientific development and towards the genre to which they unquestionably 
belong: they are eclectic surveys and collations of ethical and theological views already 
richly represented in the culture. As Harwood reminds us, Boyle 'began his career as a 
moralist, not as a natural philosopher'  (p. xviii). When, in 1650, he drew up a list of 
'treatises'  completed  or  in-progress, that  catalogue was  overwhelmingly moral  and 
theological in  character (pp. xix-xx).  The  greatest service performed by  Harwood's 
excellent introductory essay and annotations is, indeed, the identification of the textual 
sources from which Boyle's early ethical writings derived. Just as many seventeenth- 
century English Protestants kept diaries which acted as a  form of  self-discipline and 
which recorded their ceaseless interrogations of self, so this was also the great age of the 
commonplace book. Very many English  gentlemen  kept commonplace books in which they 
collected together noteworthy dicta, proverbs, exemplars, and emblems from classical or 
modern authors and which they might then draw upon repeatedly  in the civil conversations 
of later life. Such uses created and sustained a market for printed collections from which 
commonplace books might be more effectively  compiled. And, to complete the circle, many 
published ethical texts were fundamentally structured through the rearrangement and 
resituation of the contents of personal commonplace books.'2 The view that legitimate 
authorship was constituted by and through exercises of  'originality' was by no means 
standard  in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century  England.  Nor was it necessarily  considered 
that  the  ceaseless  appropriation and  reworking of  pre-existing culture was  in  any 
significant  sense illegitimate. This was a culture, unlike our own, which acknowledged the 
value of synthetic play with existing materials. 
Anyone familiar with early modern ethical writing is, therefore,  thoroughly accustomed 
to a vague, or, if sufficiently  learned, a specific sense of deja vu: 'where have I read this 
before?' In the case of Boyle's Aretology and related ethical essays, Harwood has a quite 
specific answer to  offer: the young Boyle's work was  overwhelmingly drawn from a 
massive  Encyclopcdia (1630) by the Herborn professor of philosophy and theology Johann 
Alsted (1588-1638).'3 Like a host of other early modern gentlemen, and especially those 
who had not been to university, Boyle got much of his learning at second-hand. Thus, the 
Nichomachean Ethics was of central importance for all early modern ethical writers  - 
Boyle included -  but Harwood finds little evidence of Boyle's first-hand familiarity with 
12 I owe recognition of the significance  of commonplace books in early modern natural philosophy partly to 
Ann Blair, 'Humanist methods of natural philosophy: the commonplace book', Journal of the History of Ideas 
(1992), 53, 541-51; see also Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities: Education 
and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century  Europe, Cambridge,  Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1986, chs. 6-7. 
13 Alsted was a Protestant reformer  who sought to change society through a revamped programme of moral 
education. He taught Comenius, who developed some of his educational views, and, for that reason alone, was 
doubtless found congenial by the Hartlib circle whose members  may have pressed the Encyclopedia into Boyle's 
hands. 
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Greek or  Latin moral philosophy  (pp. xxix,  xxxv-xxxvi).14  Indeed, Harwood  argues 
forcefully for the view  that Boyle's early ethical writings were pervasively shaped by 
Alsted's Encyclopedia  -  in topical content, in organization, in rhetorical form and aim, 
and, substantially, in their conceptual posture vis-a-vis the relations between knowledge 
and virtue. 
Harwood's argument  for the particular  cultural  resources  out of which these early essays 
were developed is powerfully supported. As he justifiably points  out,  Alsted has not 
previously been mentioned in connection with Boyle's intellectual development. While 
Boyle referred  to him by name in The Aretology (p. 54), neither Maddison's biography nor 
Jacob's contextual interpretation  alluded to Alsted, nor are there any references  to him in 
Thomas  Birch's  mid-eighteenth-century edition  of  Boyle's  works.  Yet,  for  all  the 
persuasiveness of Harwood's scholarship, it remains unclear how this claim stands with 
respect to  previous interpretations of  Boyle's intellectual development, and still more 
unclear how claims of this general sort bear upon the practice of intellectual biography. 
Charles Webster, for example, argued for the special importance of  the Interregnum 
Hartlib circle in the development of Boyle's Restoration philosophical and moral views, 
and Nicholas  Canny has pressed a related case for the influence of the concerns of an 
Anglo-Irish circle embracing the Boate brothers and members of  Boyle's own  family, 
notably including his father.15  Harwood sees merit in both these positions, judging them 
'plausible and easily reconciled'. In contrast, he finds James Jacob's interpretation 'far 
more problematic' (p. xxiii). And, since much interest among historians of the Scientific 
Revolution has centred upon the legitimacy of Jacob's account of the 'ideological origins' 
of  Boyle's  natural philosophy,  it  is  worth  dwelling  upon  both  the  evidential  and 
methodological bases of Harwood's dissent.16 
Of Harwood's scepticism there can be little doubt, even if it is expressed in terms so civil 
as to be allusive. First, he criticizes Jacob for incautious inference: Jacob's thesis is said to 
be ' broader than his evidence warrants' (p. xxiii). Secondly, Jacob is apparently  censured 
for emphasizing one set of historical factors -  the traumatic political circumstances  of the 
Irish Rebellion and Interregnum disorder  -  at the expense of  another set -  the general 
equipment with  which  'people  like Boyle'  came provided and  the  special resources 
supplied by Alsted. Thirdly, Harwood  obliquely suggests that interpretations such as 
Jacob's have either unjustifiably assumed or over-argued the originality of  these early 
writings. The sources upon which Boyle drew, and which he reworked in The Aretology, 
'would have been familiar to educated young men of his generation', as would have been 
14 Boyle was again not alone in also relying heavily upon Diogenes Laertius's  Lives. Much of his knowledge 
of early Christian theological texts was drawn from modern commentators, but he took in the great Protestant 
theologians and moralists at first hand, and, of course, was very deeply read in the Scriptures. Harwood also 
makes an important general case for Boyle's use of work by Sir Thomas Browne and such contemporary  Christian 
writers as Thomas Wright, Henry Hammond, and the poets Edmund  Waller, George Wither, Francis  Quarles and 
George Herbert. 
15 Charles  Webster, The Great  Instauration:  Science,  Medicine, and Reform, 1626-1660, London: Duckworth, 
1975; Nicholas Canny, The Upstart Earl: A Study of the Social and Mental World of Richard Boyle First Earl 
of Cork 1566-1643, Cambridge: Cambridge  University Press, 1982, especially ch. 7. 
16 The passages which Harwood here particularly  opposes are in Jacob, Boyle, op. cit. (1), ch. 2, especially 
47-50. 
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his  biblicism, irenicism, personal piety  and providentialism. Consequently, Harwood 
questions Jacob's stress upon a secular traditional 'aristocratic ethic' from which Boyle 
was supposed to have developed an importantly original dissent (pp. xxiii-xxiv).'7 
Harwood's  first criticism of  Jacob must,  I  think,  simply be  conceded:  thanks to 
Harwood's own research all of us now understand  vastly more about Boyle's intellectual 
formation than we knew before, even if he is perhaps less than generous in acknowledging 
the pioneering focus of Jacob's 1977 book, without which one can hardly imagine that a 
substantial present-day  audience for an edition of Boyle's early ethical writings would have 
come into being. Given the vigorously diverse interest in Boyle and the English Scientific 
Revolution these days, it is difficult to recall the extent to which this area of research 
appeared as a completed culture in the late 1970s, especially resistant to the scrutiny of the 
social historian or sociologist. James Jacob is one of the scholars we have to thank for the 
changed state of affairs. Fifteen years is a long time in our field, but it is not so long as to 
justify forgetting.18 
The remainder  of Harwood's criticisms  raises questions of more general historiographic 
interest. The centrepiece of Jacob's 'social'  interpretation of Boyle's natural philosophy 
was  a conjuncture between an individual's interest and specific events in the political 
context: Boyle's concern to protect the security of his own property-rights  and the threats 
posed  to  general property-rights by the Irish Rebellion and  Civil Wars. Out  of  this 
conjuncture,  Jacob argued,  flowed a new and particular  philosophy of nature, whose shape 
and content were crafted to acquit interest and solve contextual problems. And, of course, 
viewing  The Aretology and similar youthful writings as responses to  Boyle's specific 
political circumstances,  as well as the developmental foundations of his mature individual 
philosophy, was central to Jacob's ideological origins story. In fact, for many years it 
seemed that the exercise of identifying such conjunctures defined the social history (or 
sociological history) of science. In opposing Jacob's interpretation, Harwood juxtaposes 
the factors of cultural inheritance to those of the interest-context conjuncture. Moves of 
this kind are historiographically  familiar. Stress upon the continuity of culture as opposed 
to the exigencies of context is a standard  form in which 'internalist-externalist' arguments 
17 Harwood (p. xli, n. 45) criticizes Jacob (though on grounds that are never made explicit) for 'attach[ing] 
far too much weight' to another early Boyle practical ethical manuscript: The Gentleman (Boyle Papers  Vol. 37, 
fols.  160-3).  This is important evidence in Jacob's argument (Boyle, op.  cit.  (1), 48-9)  in favour of Boyle's 
development from an early endorsement of  a  traditional aristocratic ethic  (undeniably represented in  The 
Gentleman)  to the Christian  humanism  of the allegedly  later Aretology. (My own view is that all these early essays 
are basically synthetic experiments  in forging a plausible  identity and that it is therefore  dubious either to interpret 
any of them as representing  Boyle's 'real belief' or to arrange them confidently in a developmental sequence.) 
Nevertheless, my one regret about Harwood's selection is that The Gentleman was not included. More than any 
other early manuscript this fragment manifests Boyle's engagement with the practical early modern 'courtesy' 
literature and its views of the proper bases and circumstances  of gentility. Quite as much as the loftier Christian 
humanist canon to which Harwood rightly draws attention, the courtesy literature was also a standard part of 
a seventeenth-century  gentleman's cultural furnishing: see, e.g., Steven Shapin, "'A  scholar and a gentleman": 
the problematic identity of the scientific practitioner in early modern England', History of Science (1991), 29, 
279-327, especially 289-92;  and, for a modern interpretation  of the courtesy genre, Frank Whigham, Ambition 
and Privilege: The Social Tropes of Elizabethan  Courtesy Theory, Berkeley: University  of California  Press, 1984. 
18 I have several times acknowledged the inspiration James Jacob provided for my own research, and if, at 
times, my more recent work in this area has diverged from Jacob's in focus and substance, that work would 
scarcely have been possible without his efforts and, especially, his vigorously provocative presentation. 
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have been carried on  for generations. The continuity of  culture has been taken as an 
argument for its autonomy or self-direction while breaks in the culture have been treated 
as evidence for the influence of extrinsic factors.19 
It is a juxtaposition as insupportable as it is familiar. Why ever should the facts of 
cultural continuity be thought to embarrass  the sociologist, one of whose stocks-in-trade 
is, after all, the identification and interpretation of the institutions of socialization and 
cultural transmission? And what are the grounds upon which a historiographic choice is 
pressed to decide between two equally plausible stories: that an individual is a competent 
bearer of the culture transmitted to him, and that his life and work represent a unique 
trajectory between culture and circumstance? Here and elsewhere language of 'factors' 
shows signs of strain. Nevertheless, Harwood's emphasis upon Boyle's manipulation of a 
quite typical cultural inheritance is particularly  salutary in the present state of intellectual 
biography. 
Imagine you are listening to a piece of late eighteenth-century  sacred choral music. It is 
the Agnus dei: the alto sings plaintive pianissimo descending thirds in G minor; the violas 
and oboes double the alto for four bars; then, out of  the silence of  a one-bar pause, 
suddenly four blows on the timpani and an exultant fortissimo orchestral tutti in E flat. 
You hear, and the programme notes encourage you to hear, an ingenious, original and 
deeply felt realization of Christ's blood-sacrifice. There is even some plausible theorizing 
about this passage as an expression of the composer's own sense of impending death. You 
are profoundly moved to religious sentiments and awe of musical genius. Some time later 
you  listen to  an  earlier opera by  another composer. The  scene is  one  of  seduction, 
submission and sexual triumph. Music and purpose work splendidly together. The music 
is the same as for the Agnus dei, or very nearly so,  and here the concert programme 
confirms that, indeed, the later composer reworked this music for his sacred setting. Your 
reaction is plausibly a tincture of embarrassment  and cynicism: your first reaction was 
somehow secured by a trick; the later composer was not perhaps the genius you were told 
that he was. What belonged to him alone and to the unique expressive musical context he 
created seems in fact to have belonged to the culture. You think you should not have heard 
the later passage as a purposefully ingenious solution to a particular expressive problem: 
the composer was just going on as competent practitioners  in that culture tended to go on 
in  a range of  circumstances. His  creativity consisted 'only'  in the rearrangement and 
resituation of existing cultural materials.  Mark him down. Moral, aesthetic and intellectual 
judgments run together with apparently divergent stories about historical development: 
the one stressing the role of  individual intelligence in making-up culture and uniquely 
adapting that  culture to  individual ends, the other identifying the  appropriation and 
reworking of previously used, culturally given resources. 
The musical analogy may be stretched  and overly vivid, but it is not inappropriate  to the 
Boylean materials under discussion or to general reflections upon the genre of intellectual 
biography. Harwood  encourages us to  see the early ethical essays as the reworking of 
rather standard cultural materials, the problems confronting Boyle as similarly standard 
19 An analysis and interpretation of the relevant historiography  is Steven Shapin, 'Discipline and bounding: 
the history and sociology of science as seen through the externalism-internalism debate', History of Science, 
(1992), 30, 333-69. 
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ethical topics for people like Boyle. James Jacob, by contrast, has urged us to understand 
the  same  materials as  the  fruits of  a  unique individual conjuncture of  interest and 
circumstance.  In apparent  paradox, Jacob's 'social' interpretation,  though widely opposed 
by historians of a more traditional disposition, maps more easily than Harwood's onto 
judgements  that emphasize  what is usually taken as Boyle's deep originality.  For Jacob that 
originality had  different roots  than  for  intellectualist historians, but  it  was  no  less 
individually  innovative: the springs  of new natural  philosophy were to be sought in Boyle's 
social'  predicament rather in his 'intellectual' problematic. 
It is this finding that encourages us to  recognize something curious about common 
models of personal development in intellectual biography and about usages of such terms 
as 'social' and 'intellectual'. Harwood evidently shares with more traditional  historians of 
ideas a scepticism about 'social' interpretations,  yet his claims about Boyle's development 
are, in fact, no less 'social' than Jacob's, and, arguably, they are more sociological. What 
could be more sociological than a claim that an individual worked with, and artfully 
reworked, the materials given by his culture? And what could be less sociological than a 
historiographic  practice  which slighted the role of cultural  inheritance?  The interesting  and 
sustainable dichotomy is not, then, one between 'social' and 'intellectual' considerations 
but between interpretations  that draw adequate attention to the role of existing culture in 
an individual's making of new culture and those that do not. 
We may have to recognize that there is little that we can say with very great confidence 
about  the  domain  of  individual meanings and  the  causes of  individual careers and 
creativity. Some versions of individualistic history, however routine in appearance, may 
simply be too  speculative and too  ambitious to  yield the quality of  knowledge often 
claimed for them. By contrast,  apparently  less orthodox sociologically informed approaches 
to individual  lives may be more soundly based. Working with the visible materials  provided 
by a past culture, the historian can identify, as it were, the 'space of possibilities' occupied 
by an individual at any given time.20  That space can be conceived of as the resultant of 
what the local culture makes available and the individual's previous history. What moves 
are permissible or intelligible for an individual in a specific culture to make? How  does 
each  move  affect the  possibilities  and  probabilities of  succeeding moves?  To  many 
accustomed to the bold psychological idiom of much intellectual biography, the project I 
suggest may seem depressingly  limited. Yet there is no great loss in recognizing legitimate 
limits to certain forms of historical knowledge. 
Individualism  is not, therefore,  the only way to interpret  the doings of individuals. Much 
existing intellectual biography over-interprets  what is owing to an individual and under- 
interprets  what is owing to the culture. That practice is ultimately sustained by a network 
of evaluations. Both as historians and as commonsense actors we are the inheritors of a 
long-established practical moral  philosophy  that  recognizes an  association  between 
20  Here I sociologically mangle a notion from the psychologist Margaret A. Boden who develops the idea of 
a 'conceptual space' in a very different  inquiry into individual creativity; see her The Creative  Mind: Myths and 
Mechanisms, London:  Weidenfeld and  Nicolson,  1990,  especially 46-9,  139-50,  and  also  her,  'What  is 
creativity?', unpublished paper delivered to  the  Achievement Project conference on  'The  Measurement of 
Achievement', Ashford, Kent, 11-15 December 1991. I also acknowledge valuable  viva voce comments by Jacques 
Revel on my 'Who was Robert Boyle?' (cited in note 9). 
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individuality, truth and value, on the one hand, and collectivity, convention and error, on 
the other. A portrayal of the isolated divine, artist or philosopher is a means persistently 
used in our culture  to say 'good' about the producers  of our most highly valued knowledge, 
just as the depiction of practitioners as embedded members of their society's culture is 
widely understood as denigration.2'  The pull of the association between individuality and 
epistemic value is powerful, yet it can be defied. And the most effective way of resisting it 
is to  question the dichotomy which invites us normatively to  choose between isolated 
knowers fabricating their culture out of thin air or individual circumstance and 'cultural 
dopes' doing nothing more than reflecting existing knowledge or social predicament. 
This edition of Boyle's early writings comes at an opportune moment, both in the small 
world of Boyle studies and in the much larger  world of intellectual biography. Just because 
the  biographical genre is  so  well  established within  intellectual history, its  reflective 
justification has  been relatively undeveloped. Much  biography has  tended to  import 
questionable psychological theories into history without noting that it has done so, while 
many sociologists have run fast in the other direction when asked to interpret the course 
of individual lives. More locally, it is certain that Harwood's edition will prompt further 
historical interest in the life and work of Robert Boyle. The publication of these materials 
arguably means that we now know as much about the early intellectual and moral views 
of  Robert Boyle as we  do  about any other early modern man of  science.22 (And the 
indications are that, thanks to the industrious archival labours of Michael Hunter and his 
associates, we are soon to know much more.) These resources have already been pressed 
into  service to  answer developmental questions of  the sort 'why  did Boyle become a 
scientist?', and it is inevitable that they will be enlisted in many similar inquiries. I have 
tried here to argue that questions of this form are more problematic than they sometimes 
appear. I have suggested revised approaches  to the genre of intellectual biography in which 
such materials  are no less valuable, even if they have to be dealt with in a less self-contained 
fashion. And I have drawn attention to some interesting  relationships  between the way we 
understand personal development and persistent patterns of cultural evaluation. 
STEVEN SHAPIN 
Department of Sociology and Science Studies Program, 
University of California, San Diego, 




21  On this topic, see Steven Shapin, "' The mind is its own place ": science and solitude in seventeenth-century 
England," Science in Context (1991), 4, 191-218. 
22  Those of a psycho-sexuo-biographical  bent will, no doubt, soon spot that the Boylean materials provide a 
far richer seam of the relevant naughty bits than the Newtonian sources exploited by Frank Manuel's A Portrait 
of Isaac Newton,  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968. 
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